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Congress, Controlled Substances, and Physician-Assisted 
Suicide — Elephants in Mouseholes
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. 
Oregon to reject the U.S. attorney general’s author-
ity to prohibit physicians in Oregon from pre-
scribing Schedule II drugs for their terminally ill 
patients to commit suicide can seem paradoxical 
and confusing.1 How is it that California cannot 
permit the patients of physicians who recom-
mend marijuana, a Schedule I drug, to possess 
legally and use marijuana that they may need to 
survive, but Oregon can legally permit physi-
cians to prescribe Schedule II drugs and patients 
to possess and use such drugs to end their lives?
The key to the answer lies in distinguishing 
between the two classes of questions by which 
the U.S. Supreme Court primarily decides cases: 
is a statute consistent with the U.S. Constitution 
— that is, is it “constitutional”? — and what does 
a federal statute actually mean? The California 
case was decided on the basis of the first ques-
tion, and the Oregon case on the second. More 
specifically, in the California case, Congress had 
outlawed any use of marijuana by classifying it 
under Schedule I, which includes drugs that 
have “no currently acceptable medical use.” The 
legal question was whether Congress had the 
constitutional authority to make this classifica-
tion under its Commerce Clause powers.2 The 
Court determined that it did, concluding that 
the Commerce Clause gave Congress the same 
power to regulate marijuana grown at home for 
personal, medically related uses as it had to reg-
ulate the amount of wheat a farmer grew on his 
farm for personal consumption.3 The fact that a 
physician would recommend or prescribe the 
marijuana for medical purposes was found to 
be irrelevant.2,3 In the Oregon case, the power 
of Congress to regulate the use of drugs in the 
practice of medicine is not at issue; Congress can 
set national drug-prescribing rules. The question 
is: how did Congress affect the authority of states 
to set medical practice standards by enacting the 
Controlled Substances Act in 1970, which places 
substances in one of five schedules on the basis 
of their potential for abuse or dependence?
the controlled subs tances ac t
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion of 
the Court in Gonzales v. Oregon, which was decid-
ed by a six-to-three vote. The opinion begins: 
“The question before us is whether the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) allows the United States 
Attorney General to prohibit doctors from pre-
scribing regulated drugs for use in physician-
assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law 
permitting the procedure.”1 In 1997 the Court 
had observed that “Americans are engaged in an 
earnest and profound debate about the morali-
ty, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted 
suicide.” 4 The current case is not about the Ore-
gon law itself but about whether Congress had 
given the U.S. attorney general the authority to 
nullify its effect.
The Oregon statute — the first and still the 
only state law to authorize physicians to write 
prescriptions for a lethal dose of drugs for pa-
tients who were terminally ill but mentally com-
petent and who asked for such a prescription at 
least twice — was adopted by ballot measure, 
first in 1994 and again in 1997.5 In 1997, Attor-
ney General Janet Reno was asked by a group of 
senators to determine that prescribing drugs for 
suicide was not a “legitimate medical practice,” 
as required by the Controlled Substances Act, and 
that writing such a prescription could therefore 
result in the revocation of one’s registration cer-
tificate with the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) and federal criminal prosecution. Reno 
refused, concluding that the Controlled Substanc-
es Act did not authorize her to “displace the states 
as the primary regulators of the medical profes-
sion, or to override a state’s determination as to 
what constitutes legitimate medical practice.”1
John Ashcroft, who as a senator had support-
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ed federal efforts to curtail physician-assisted 
suicide, was appointed attorney general in 2001. 
In November 2001 he issued an Interpretive Rule 
that stated:
[A]ssisting suicide is not a “legitimate medi-
cal purpose” within the meaning of [exist-
ing regulations], and prescribing, dispens-
ing, or administering federally controlled 
substances to assist suicide violates the 
Controlled Substances Act. Such conduct by 
a physician registered to dispense controlled 
substances may “render his registration . . . 
inconsistent with the public interest” and 
[is] therefore subject to possible suspen-
sion or revocation . . . regardless of wheth-
er state law authorizes or permits such 
conduct by practitioners or others and re-
gardless of the condition of the person 
whose suicide is assisted.6
Every prescription filled under the Oregon law 
has included Schedule II drugs, and such drugs 
cannot be legally prescribed without registration 
with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Thus, 
in practice, the Oregon law would be rendered 
ineffective by the Ashcroft rule. Accordingly, a 
lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court of 
Oregon, and the court enjoined the enforcement 
of the rule.7 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the 
Ashcroft rule was invalid because, by making a 
medical procedure authorized under Oregon law 
a federal offense, the rule changed “the usual 
constitutional balance between the States and the 
Federal Government” without a clear congressio-
nal statement authorizing this change.8
s tatutory interpretation
As a general rule, courts permit officials in the 
executive branch who are charged with adminis-
tering specific statutes, such as the Controlled 
Substances Act, to interpret their meaning. Courts 
give “substantial deference” to these interpre-
tations if the statute is ambiguous and Congress 
has given the agency the authority to make regu-
lations to enforce it.
How much deference did Attorney General 
Ashcroft’s interpretation of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act deserve? The Court decided it didn’t 
deserve much, for three basic reasons. First, the 
Court found as unpersuasive the government’s ar-
gument that the attorney general was really just 
interpreting one of his own regulations, since the 
regulation did “little more than restate the terms 
of the statute itself,” and thus the attorney general 
was actually interpreting the statute itself, not one 
of his own regulations. Specifically, the Controlled 
Substances Act requires that controlled substanc-
es be prescribed only for a “currently accepted 
medical use” and that a “valid prescription” can 
only be “issued for a legitimate medical purpose.” 
The regulation uses terms that are substantially 
identical, and the Court concluded that by simply 
restating a statute, like a parrot, an agency gets no 
“special authority to interpret its own words.” 1
The second reason the Court gave for not 
granting deference to the attorney general’s in-
terpretation is that the Controlled Substances 
Act is not ambiguous and Congress did not del-
egate the authority to the attorney general to in-
terpret the act. One reason is that if the attorney 
general really had the power to remove physi-
cians from the Controlled Substances Act reg-
istry simply because he concluded that their 
registrations were inconsistent with “the pub-
lic interest,” the attorney general’s power would 
be “extraordinary.” He would, for example, have 
been given the power “to deregister a physician 
simply because he deemed a controversial prac-
tice permitted by state law to have an illegiti-
mate medical purpose” — not just the statutory 
power to remove the registrations of physicians 
who falsified their applications, were convicted 
of a felony, or had their state medical licenses re-
voked. But, the Court concluded, nothing in the 
Controlled Substances Act gives the attorney gen-
eral the power to “define the substantive stan-
dards of medical practice. . . .”1 Instead, the 
Court noted, it is the secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services who has authority under the Con-
trolled Substances Act to set medical standards, 
specifically those involving “the medical treat-
ment of . . . narcotic addiction.”1
To support this conclusion, the Court referred 
directly to an international treaty, the Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances, which the 
United States had ratified. When it passed a stat-
ute to enforce the convention, Congress spe-
cifically stated that “nothing in the Convention 
will interfere with the ethical practice of medi-
cine as determined by [the secretary of Health 
and Human Services] on the basis of a consen-
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sus of the view of the American medical and 
scientific community.”1 The Court found that the 
structure of the Controlled Substances Act is 
the same as the structure of its law enforcing 
the Convention and thus conveys an unwilling-
ness on the part of Congress “to cede medical 
judgments to an Executive official who lacks 
medical expertise.”1 Congress has the constitu-
tional power to delegate medical decision-mak-
ing authority to the attorney general. But the 
Court found that Congress did not do so because, 
among other reasons, the judgments the attor-
ney general claimed to have the legal authority 
to make are “quintessentially medical judgments,” 
“beyond his expertise and incongruous with the 
statutory purposes and design.”1 Citing one of 
its prior cases, the Court has adopted its central 
metaphor to decide this case: “Congress, we have 
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions — it does not, one might say, hide ele-
phants in mouseholes.”1
a legitimate medic al pr ac tice?
The final argument that the Court considered 
was the attorney general’s claim that the Con-
trolled Substances Act itself prohibits physician-
assisted suicide with the use of controlled sub-
stances because this use of Schedule II drugs is 
not a “legitimate medical practice.” In the Califor-
nia medical marijuana case, the Court concluded 
that in enacting the Controlled Substances Act, 
Congress sought to “conquer drug abuse and to 
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in 
controlled substances.”2 The Court had not pre-
viously had occasion, however, to determine “the 
extent to which the CSA regulates medical prac-
tice beyond prohibiting a doctor from acting as 
a drug ‘pusher’ instead of a physician.”1 The 
Court had previously decided that the law pro-
hibits the “large-scale overprescribing of meth-
adone,” which is not consistent with accepted 
medical practices,9 and in the California case 
that Congress itself had expressly found that 
marijuana had no accepted medical use.2
The Court ruled that, on the basis of its “text 
and design,” the Controlled Substances Act can-
not reasonably be read as prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide. The Court reached this conclu-
sion because “the statute manifests no intent to 
regulate the practice of medicine generally” and 
because, under basic principles of federalism, 
the states have “great latitude under their police 
powers to legislate as to the protection of the 
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all per-
sons.”1 The Court concluded not only that the 
practice of medicine is a state-regulated activity 
and that Congress did not mean to make it fed-
erally regulated under the Controlled Substances 
Act, but also that the Oregon law itself is a good 
example of how states actually regulate the 
practice of medicine:
Rather than simply decriminalizing assist-
ed suicide, [the Oregon law] limits its ex-
ercise to the attending physicians of termi-
nally ill patients, physicians who must be 
licensed by Oregon’s Board of Medical 
examiners. . . . The statute gives attending 
physicians a central role, requiring them to 
provide prognoses and prescriptions, give 
information about palliative alternatives and 
counseling, and ensure patients are compe-
tent and acting voluntarily. Any eligible pa-
tient must also get a second opinion from 
another registered physician, and the stat-
ute’s safeguards require physicians to keep 
and submit to inspection detailed records 
of their actions.1
Nonetheless, the Court found as “at least rea-
sonable” the attorney general’s contention that 
physician-assisted suicide is not a legitimate med-
ical practice because it violates the position of 
prominent medical organizations, the federal gov-
ernment, and 49 states.1 A “reasonable” interpre-
tation of a statute on the part of the attorney gen-
eral would be acceptable to the Court, but only 
if the statute itself authorized the attorney gen-
eral to interpret it. The Court decided that the 
Controlled Substances Act did not allow this in-
terpretation, because Congress did not authorize 
the attorney general “to bar a use [of a con-
trolled substance] simply because it may be in-
consistent with one reasonable understanding 
of medical practice.”1 Instead, the Court conclud-
ed that the attorney general’s powers under the 
Controlled Substances Act consist only of re-
stricting the prescribing practices of physicians 
of drugs that have a potential for addiction or 
recreational use. To “read prescriptions for as-
sisted suicide as constituting ‘drug abuse’ under 
the CSA is discordant with the phrase’s consis-
legal issues in medicine
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tent use throughout the statute, not to mention 
its ordinary meaning.”1 The Court ended the 
opinion with a characterization of its ruling as a 
“commonsense” one in that “the background 
principles of our federal system . . . belie the 
notion that Congress would use such an obscure 
grant of authority to regulate areas traditionally 
supervised by the States’ police powers.”1
States have traditionally licensed physicians 
and regulated the practice of medicine. Federal 
activity historically has been limited to regulat-
ing the manufacture and sale of drugs and devic-
es and to controlling drug trafficking and recre-
ational uses of drugs. Once a drug is approved 
as “safe and effective” for any use, physicians are 
able to exercise their medical judgment to pre-
scribe it for any other use consistent with the 
practice of medicine, as determined by state law 
and actual medical practice. Ultimately, the Court 
ruled, nothing Congress did when it enacted the 
Controlled Substances Act changed the respective 
roles of the states and the federal government.
jus tice sc alia’s  dissent
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which 
was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief 
Justice John Roberts. Scalia would have deferred 
to the attorney general’s interpretation of the 
Controlled Substances Act. Scalia’s strongest ar-
gument, I think, is that Congress had set an ob-
jective federal standard of “legitimate medical 
practice” when it enacted the Controlled Substanc-
es Act. Under this federal standard, it was (as the 
majority of the Court conceded) “at least reason-
able” (a phrase Scalia described as testing “the 
limits of understatement”) for the attorney gen-
eral to conclude, on the basis of the laws of 49 
states and the federal government as well as ba-
sic standards of medical ethics, that assisting a 
patient’s suicide is not a legitimate medical pur-
pose of a drug prescription. Scalia argued that 
the majority had confused “the normative inquiry 
of what the boundaries of medicine should be — 
which it is laudably hesitant to undertake — with 
the objective inquiry of what the accepted defini-
tion of ‘medicine’ is.” Scalia continued, “The fact 
that many in Oregon believe that the boundaries 
of ‘legitimate medicine’ should be extended to in-
clude assisted suicide does not change the fact that 
the overwhelming weight of authority . . . con-
firms that they have not yet been so extended.”1 
Scalia also rejected the notion that hiding “el-
ephants in mouseholes” was an apt description 
of congressional intent, noting that the attorney 
general has attempted to regulate the uses of con-
trolled substances outside the setting of addiction 
and recreational use in only four areas: assisted 
suicide, aggressive therapy of pain management, 
the use of anabolic steroids, and cosmetic weight-
loss therapy. In none of these four areas, Scalia 
argued, had the attorney general’s assertion of 
power done anything to undermine the statutory 
scheme. 
Scalia found that all of the attorney general’s 
actions were consistent with a reasonable inter-
pretation of a “uniform federal standard for le-
gitimacy of medical practice” in relation to the 
prescription of drugs. Scalia closed his opinion 
with an agreement with the majority that Con-
gress can outlaw physician assisted-suicide if it 
wants to:
Using the federal commerce power to pre-
vent assisted suicide is unquestionably per-
missible. The question before us is not wheth-
er Congress can do this, or even whether 
Congress should do this; but simply wheth-
er Congress has done this in the CSA. I think 
there is no doubt that it has.1
the role of physicians
Like most judicial opinions devoted to the inter-
pretation of a statute, this one is not all that mon-
umental, and Congress can rewrite the statute if 
it disagrees with the Court’s interpretation. Al-
though the vote was six to three, the outcome of 
the case was difficult to predict in advance. I have 
never been all that enamored of the Oregon law, 
and I continue to believe that Oregon’s approach 
of providing physicians with immunity for the 
prescription of drugs for suicide is flawed — both 
because it undercuts medical professionalism by 
making the prescription of drugs for terminally 
ill patients who might be suicidal “much more 
bureaucratic and burdensome, and less private 
and accountable” and because it requires physi-
cians specifically “to intend the deaths of their 
patients.”10 Nonetheless, more than a decade af-
ter its enactment, in a contest between the sel-
dom-used Oregon statute and a federal agency’s 
assertion of power over all U.S. physicians’ pre-
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scriptions of scheduled drugs, it was not really 
possible to root for the attorney general. More-
over, the DEA lately has seemed much more men-
acing to physicians than it had been, especially 
since the agency withdrew its support for pain-
prescribing guidelines that had been adopted by 
the Federation of State Medical Boards.11,12 Quill 
and Meier, for example, have argued that, had 
the Court ruled the other way, “physicians may 
become hesitant to prescribe the best available 
medications to manage the pain, agitation, and 
shortness of breath that sometimes accompany 
the end stages of illness. As a result, they may, 
in essence, abandon patients and their families 
in their moment of greatest need.”13
To the extent that this prophecy might have 
been correct, Gonzales v. Oregon should be a major 
comfort to physicians, for two reasons. First, 
the majority of the justices found great signifi-
cance in the fact that the Oregon statute sets 
procedures for physicians to follow and explicitly 
trusts that they will follow them in the exercise 
of medical judgment. Thus, the Court’s charac-
terization, in the California medical marijuana 
case, of some physicians as potential criminals 
now seems limited to physicians involved in 
drug trafficking of the type included in the Con-
trolled Substances Act. Second, this opinion strictly 
limits the jurisdiction of the DEA with regard to 
physicians to those involved in drug trafficking. 
Physicians who treat terminally ill patients or 
patients with cancer at any stage of their illness 
have never had much to fear from the DEA; now 
they have nothing to fear from it. As Quill and 
Meier might put it, to the extent that “for better 
or worse, the DEA sets the tone and drives per-
ceptions about legal risk associated with pre-
scribing Schedule 2 drugs for seriously ill and 
dying patients,”13 the tone should be nothing 
but supportive of keeping patients free of pain 
and discomfort.
Virtually anything that encourages what has 
been termed “a palliative ethic of care”14 has 
strong public support and is supported by the 
Court as well. This attitude is probably why, al-
though all nine justices agree that Congress has 
the constitutional authority under the Commerce 
Clause to outlaw the prescription of controlled 
substances for physician-assisted suicide at any 
time, there has been no movement in Congress 
to do so. The lack of Congressional reaction to 
the opinion may also reflect the overwhelming 
condemnation on the part of the public of Con-
gress’s attempt to interfere with the medical (and 
legal) judgments about the treatment of Terri 
Schiavo.14-16
national s tandards
of medic al pr ac tice
Now that there is no longer any serious question 
that Congress has the authority under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate the practice of medi-
cine, the issue of national medical licensure and 
standards of medical practice may receive more 
attention. The Court is certainly correct in not-
ing that Congress historically has been loath to 
legislate medical practice, preferring to see the 
areas in which it has legislated — such as drug 
trafficking, recreational drug use, female genital 
mutilation, and even so-called partial-birth abor-
tion — not as the practice of medicine at all, but 
something outside of it. Nonetheless, there is 
tension between the historical role of the state 
in terms of licensing physicians and setting stan-
dards of medical practice and arguments in fa-
vor of national practice standards.
Medical schools are all substantially identical 
in their training, and all their graduates must 
pass the same national examinations. State licen-
sure seems to be a relic in a country where actual 
practice standards are set nationally and where 
local variations of these standards are seen as 
problems. Furthermore, Congress has acted to at-
tempt to control medical practices that it has 
viewed as intolerable. For example, it has acted 
in the areas of medical research standards, in 
order to protect human subjects, and emergency 
treatment requirements in hospitals, in order to 
protect patients with a medical emergency. The 
question is not whether national practice stan-
dards for physicians and hospitals could be a good 
thing; they could be. It has been persuasively sug-
gested, for example, that the adoption of six pa-
tient-safety practices by U.S. hospitals could save 
up to 100,000 lives in the first two years.17 The 
question is, who will have the authority to set the 
practice standards? It is one thing to decide that 
national standards will be set by the relevant spe-
cialty boards or other national medical organiza-
tions on the basis of evidence that supports the 
relevance of such standards to the health and 
welfare of patients; it is quite another to say that 
standards will be set by Congress or the attor-
legal issues in medicine
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ney general on the basis of the political winds 
of the day.
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CLINICAL TRIAL REGISTRATION
The Journal encourages investigators to register their clinical trials 
in a public trials registry. The members of the International Committee 
of Medical Journal Editors plan to consider clinical trials for publication 
only if they have been registered (see N Engl J Med 2004;351:1250-1). 
The National Library of Medicine’s www.clinicaltrials.gov is a free registry, 
open to all investigators, that meets the committee’s requirements.
The New England Journal of Medicine 
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on December 3, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission. 
 Copyright © 2006 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved. 
